1.      19/9 ore 11-13

Some surprising phenomena, and some unsatisfactory explanations of them.

Science is sometimes predictively successful in some very surprising ways. Sometimes scientific theories make novel predictions that are subsequently empirically confirmed, sometimes they give us knowledge of previously inaccessible parts of reality, and sometimes they lead us, on more or less a priori grounds, to empirical predictions that turn out to be right.

How are these cases of surprising success to be explained? A range of possible explanations is considered. It is argued that, even Scientific Realism is true, there is a sense which Scientific Realism, by itself, does not offer a satisfactory explanation of them.

2.      27/9 h. 11-13

Can novel predictive success be explained without realism?

In this talk a possible way of explaining the cases of success described in the first talk is outlined. The way of explaining realism to be outlined is compatible with realism, but it does not use realism. Instead, the cases of surprising success are explained by means of the concept of the “independence of theory from data”. This concept is related simplicity, and to the idea of “lack of adhoc-ness”. The key idea is that if a theory has a high degree of independence from the data, it has an increased chance of predictive success, and even of novel predictive success. But a high degree of independence need not confer on a theory an increased probability of truth, in the realist sense of “truth”. 

3.      27/9 h. 15-17

A route to scientific realism without IBE – “Eddington inferences”.

One controversy in the philosophy of science is: Does the fact that a particular scientific theory provides us with the best explanation in some domain justify realism with respect to the subject matter of the theory? This question is not addressed in this talk, however, it is argued that even if a theory’s being the best does not justify realism with respect to its subject matter, still, realism may be justified. The aim of this talk is to defend and develop a route to Scientific Realism that does not use Inference to the Best Explanation. The route defended is that of an “Eddington-inference” which, it is argued, can be given a probabilistic justification. The justification that can be given for Eddington inferences is at least as strong as that for induction.

4.      28/9 h. 11-13

Eddington inferences and realism about atoms.

The aim of this talk is to argue that the approach to scientific realism based on Eddington inferences can apply to the case of atoms. It is argued that major early proponents of realism about atoms used Eddington inferences. The work of James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein is discussed, but particular attention is paid to the investigations of Jean Perrin. Perrin’s work focussed on the (many) different available methods for determining the value of Avogadro’s Number. Perrin’s work uses Eddington inferences and, it is argued, on this viewtherefore rationally justifies belief in the existence of atoms.

5.      28/9 h. 15-17

Science and General Rationality

The aim of this talk is to examine the relations between what we might call “scientific rationality” and “rationality in general”. It is argued that the type of rationality we find exemplified in the physical or mathematical sciences has significant points of similarity with the type of reasoning regarded as rational in domains that would generally be thought to be quite remote from the physical or mathematical sciences. Some examples to be discussed are:

            *The theory of evolution by natural selection

            *Some examples from archaeology

            *“Common sense” versus delusional thinking.

It is argued that there are significant underlying similarities in all these cases. More specifically, it is argued that the type of reasoning we find exemplified in Darwin’s reasoning, in some examples from archaeology, and in common sense as opposed to delusional thinking, has some surprising underlying similarities to the type of reasoning regarded as good in the mathematical and physical sciences. It is also argued that the type of thinking we find exemplified in these examples (evolution, archaeology, and common-sense) seems to have broadly the same structure as the thinking leading, in the physical sciences, to novel or surprising predictive success.